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NOTES
Community Property and the
Marital Deduction - A Clarification
I. THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as originally enacted, made
no special provision for the tax treatment of the interest of spouses
in the community property. The courts considered both income
ownership and property ownership to be matters of state property
law.' Thus, under the estate tax provisions one-half of the community
property would be included in the gross estate of the first spouse to
die, and the other half would be included in the gross estate of the
survivor.' In the usual case in a common-law jurisdiction, however,
the bulk of the marital wealth would be taxed upon the death of
the husband! The graduated income and estate tax rates resulted in
a discrimination against taxpayers in the common-law jurisdictions.
The Revenue Act of 1942' sought to achieve an equalization of the
effect of the revenue laws by eliminating the advantages enjoyed by
the community property states. Community property interests were
to be treated as joint interests and included in the gross estate of the
first spouse to die' unless the survivor could show some part thereof
"to have been received as compensation for personal services actually
rendered."' This provision produced both inequalities and acute ad-
ministrative difficulties with "tracing."
The second attempt at equalization came in the Revenue Act of
1948," which repealed the Revenue Act of 1942 and took a different
approach from its predecessor. By means of a marital deduction, the
1948 Act sought to make the pre-1942 tax advantages of the com-
munity property system available to the non-community property
jurisdictions without requiring the common-law jurisdictions to
'Commissioner v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930);
Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 913 (1959); Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax Equalization--The Marital Deduction,
36 Calif. L. Rev. 223 (1948).
'Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
supra note 1.
'S. Rep. No. 1013 (pt. 1), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(e) (2), added by ch. 619, 56 Star. 798 (1942).
5 In § 811 (e) of the 1939 Code, "joint interests" was amended to read "joint and com-
munity interests." The joint interest provision is now § 2040 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
6 Ibid.
S. Rep., supra note 3.
'Ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110 (1948).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
adopt the community property system.9 The marital deduction," to
be taken in calculating the taxable estate, is allowed for any property
interest which "passes"" to the surviving spouse, provided such inter-
est is included in calculating the gross estate of the decedent." The
maximum deduction is fifty per cent of the "adjusted gross estate,""
and the value of decedent's share of the community is deducted in
calculating the adjusted gross estate. 4 Community property states
enjoy the same advantages because the repeal of the 1942 Act restored
the original rules by which only one-half of the community property
was included in the respective estate of each spouse.
There are several limitations on the marital deduction. The inter-
est must "pass" to the surviving spouse" from property included
in the decedent's gross estate0 and must not be a "terminable" inter-
est.'7 The value of the interest must be reduced by any estate tax paid
out of the interest." Furthermore, any encumbrance on the prop-
erty passing to the surviving spouse or any obligation of the sur-
viving spouse with respect to the passing of such interest must be
taken into account in determining its valuation." The deduction is
limited to fifty per cent of the decedent's adjusted gross estate."
S. Rep., supra note 3, at 27.
With the repeal of the 1942 amendments, your committee recommends estate
and gift tax splitting which is similar in its effect to the splitting of the in-
come tax provided for in this bill. It is recognized that complete equalization
of the estate and gift taxes cannot be achieved because of the inherent differ-
ences between community and non-community property. . . . [U]nder the
estate tax provision of your committee's bill a decedent spouse is allowed
a marital deduction from his gross estate.
''lnt. Rev. Code of 1939, S 812(e), added by ch. 186, 62 Stat. 110 (1948), which
corresponds to § 2056 of Int. Rev. Code of 1954. Reference will be made to the 1954 Code
except in discussion of cases decided under the 1939 Code.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(e) defines the "passing" of property for purposes
of the marital deduction.
12nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(a).
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c). The adjusted gross estate is the gross estate
less the deductions available under §§ 2053 and 2054.
'AThe "special rule" of S 2056(c)(2)(B)(i) eliminates the value of decedent's
share of the community property. The survivor's share of the community is not included
in the decedent's gross estate and is thus excluded from the marital deduction by § 2056(a).
Thus, although the marital deduction can be funded with community property, the
maximum amount of the deduction is approximately one-half of the decedent's separate
property.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(a); see note 11 supra.
"OSee note 12 supra.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(1). In general, a terminable interest is an
interest (such as a life estate) which will terminate or fail and to which someone other
than the surviving spouse will succeed.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (4) (A).
lInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (4) (B); see text accompanying notes 53-60 infra.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c); see note 13 supra.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION" AND THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
Under the Texas community property system, each spouse has
ownership and testamentary disposition of one-half of the com-
munity property." If one spouse, in his will, unambiguously attempts
to dispose of the survivor's one-half of the community property and
to substitute therefor other benefits, he forces the survivor to elect
between the inconsistent rights." The survivor is required either to
assent to the dispositon of the will or to reject the bequests and take
the rights at law. 4 The survivor's choice or election involves the
transfer of property and, hence, estate and gift tax consequences. 2
With regard to the marital deduction possibilities of the widow's
election, the first question involves the extent to which the survivor's
rights at law can qualify in the event she elects not to take under the
will. In Texas, a surviving wife has a right to her one-half interest in
the community, the exempt property or the allowance in lieu
thereof," the homestead rights,2 and the family allowance. 9 For
purposes of ascertaining the applicability of the marital deduction,
the nature of these interests under state law is generally considered
determinative.' Of course, for these rights to qualify for the marital
deduction, they must meet the conditions discussed above.3' The right
of the surviving wife to the exempt property (other than home-
stead) exists only if the estate is insolvent; 2 otherwise, this property
passes to the heirs or distributees 3 No cases have arisen on this point,
but on principle it would seem that if the estate were insolvent and
the separate, exempt property of the husband passed absolutely to the
21 The widow's election has been treated admirably in Comment, The Widow's Election
-A Study in Three Parts, 15 Sw. L.J. 85 (1961) (hereinafter cited Widow's Election
Study); see also Wren, The Widow's Election, 100 Trusts & Estates Nos. 1, at 13, and 2,
at 108 (Jan. & Feb. 1961).
22Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955); Dakan v. Dakan, 125
Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
2" Comment, Widow's Election Study, 15 Sw. L.J. 85, 93 (1961). See also Commissioner
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
24Miller v. Miller, 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951); Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex.
174 (1863).
25 The taxable effect of this election will be considered in detail in text accompanying
notes 70-80 infra.2 6 Tex. Const. art. 16, § 15; Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 45 (1956).
2 Tex. Const. art. 16, 5 49; Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 271 (1956).
' Tex. Const. art. 16, §§ 50, 51; Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §5 271-85 (1956).
2
'
9 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 286-93 (1956).
.°United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1961); Hoffman
v. McGuinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir.
1955); see also Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 414, 419 (1963).
3' See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
"
2Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 279 (1956).
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 278 (1956).
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wife, a marital deduction would be allowed." The survivor's right in
the homestead generally is considered a terminable interest and thus
excepted from the marital deduction provisions by section 2056(b)
(1) of the 1954 Code."5 The Texas homestead rights would seem to fit
this pattern and not be available for the deduction even if they would
otherwise qualify."6 The family allowance should qualify for the
marital deduction. 7 Thus, if the wife elects to take against the will of
her husband and take her rights at law, there is little chance of a sig-
nificant marital deduction from the husband's gross estate."
Far more often in the marital deduction cases, however, the wife
elects to accept the will of her husband and take the benefits there-
under. Assuming that the husband has devised property to the sur-
vivor in lieu of her rights at law, to what extent, if at all, is the
marital deduction allowable? For example, the usual widow's election
will requires the widow to elect either to take her share of the com-
munity or to take certain specific bequests under the husband's will
and allow her share of the community to pass under the will. United
States v. Stapfs' is the first case to deal directly with the question of
what effect the widow's election to accept such a will has on the
availability of the marital deduction to the husband's estate."
III. THE NET BENEFIT RULE-United States v. Stapf
Lowell H. Stapf, a resident of Texas, died July 29, 1953, and his
will put his wife to an election. By electing not to take under the
will, Mrs. Stapf could have retained her one-half of the community
property, subject to its prorata share of the administration expenses
"It is highly improbable, though not impossible, that such a situation could arise. The
$60,000 exemption provided by S 2052 would eliminate most insolvent estates from paying
estate taxes.
" United States v. Hiles, 318 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963) (concerning Alabama homestead
law); United States v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1962).
a See generally Speer, Marital Rights § 457 (1929). Article 16, § 52 of the Texas
Constitution provides for the descent and distribution of the homestead. Whatever the
exact nature of the survivor's rights in the homestead, it is settled that it concerns use
by a family constituent rather than title, so that one loses homestead rights upon death
or abandonment of the property. So far as the surviving spouse is concerned, it is at most
a life estate. Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 19 S.W.2d 35 (1929).
a United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1961); Estate
of William A. Landers, Sr., 38 T.C. 528 (1962); Estate of Rudinck, 36 T.C. 1021 (1961).
3s In some states it is possible to get a significant marital deduction by taking one's
rights at law. See, e.g., Isaac Harter, Jr., 39 T.C. 511 (1962) (N.Y. law).
3"375 U.S. 118 (1963).
40 No case has dealt with the effect on the marital deduction of a widow's electing
her rights at law other than the community. Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate & Gift
Taxes 396 (1962), would support the holding of the Stapf case (discussed infra) when the
community property is involved, but distinguishes the survivor's other rights at law on
the ground that these other rights "pass" to the surviving spouse rather than being her
own property.
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and community debts. The net value of her interest in the com-
munity was 111,442.68 dollars. Mrs. Stapf elected to take under
her husband's will which provided that she was to receive one-third
of her husband's separate property (valued at 21,666.66 dollars),
the community automobile (valued at 700 dollars) , and one-third
of the combined community estate. The total value of the bequests
to the widow was 106,268.18 dollars." Thus, by electing to take
under the will and allowing part of her community interest to pass
under the will into a trust for the Stapf children, Mrs. Stapf sustained
a net loss of 5,174.50 dollars.' In computing Mr. Stapf's estate tax,
his executors claimed a marital deduction in the amount of 22,366.66
dollars, which represented the one-third of Mr. Stapf's separate
property and the 700 dollar valuation of the automobile. The Com-
missioner disallowed the deduction, but both the district court" and
the court of appeals' sustained the taxpayer and allowed the marital
deduction. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed
the lower court on all points and disallowed the marital deduction.
The marital deduction issue" presented in the Stapf case is whether,
in calculating the deduction, the amount of property which passed
to Mrs. Stapf under the will must be reduced by the value of the
property she gave up in electing to take under the will. Since Mrs.
Stapf sustained a net loss in making the election, there would be no
marital deduction if she were required to "net" the amounts. On the
other hand, if the calculation of the marital deduction does not
require a reduction of the value of the bequest under the will by
what she gave up, the marital deduction clearly is allowable. The
property "passed" to the surviving spouse; it was not a "terminable
, The Supreme Court stated that there was some question regarding to what extent,
if at all, the automobile would qualify for the marital deduction, but since this question
would not affect the outcome of the case, they accepted the findings of the lower court.
375 U.S. at 121.
42 Mr. Stapf's will also provided that in the event his wife elected to take under the
will "all and not merely one-half" of the community debts and expenses were to be paid
by his executors. The Supreme Court disallowed a deduction of the full expenses and
debts. For this aspect of the case see Note, 17 Sw. L.J. 499 (1963). With regard to the
effect of this provision on the marital deduction issue, the Court stated that even if the
payment of the expenses did constitute a gift to the surviving spouse, this still would not
give the wife a net benefit and thus would not alter the decision on the marital deduction
issue.
"The court of appeals used a different calculation with the same result. Mrs. Stapf
allowed one-sixth (one-third of her one-half) to pass according to her husband's will
(valued at $27,541.16), and received, in exchange, property of the aggregate value of
$22,366.66. These figures also show the net loss of $5,174.50. 309 F.2d 592, 594 (5th Cir.
1962).
4189 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
45 309 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962).
"As to the other issue concerning expenses and debts see note 42 supra.
47 See note 15 supra.
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interest," ' and it did not exceed one-half of the decedent's adjusted
gross estate. 9
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Goldberg,
unanimously sustained the Commissioner and denied the marital
deduction. The Court used three basic arguments in reaching its
conclusion-(a) no property passed to the surviving spouse; (b) the
property was encumbered; and (c) the deduction would defeat the
purpose of the statute.
A. No Property Passed To The Surviving Spouse
The taxpayer argued that the marital deduction statute applied
to property passing to the surviving spouse, and if property not sub-
ject to the limitations of the Code"0 passes, then the marital deduction
should be allowed. It is immaterial, the taxpayer argued, that prop-
erty also passed from the surviving spouse in trust for the Stapf
children. Looking through the form of the transaction to its economic
substance, the Court concluded that no property actually passed to
the surviving spouse within the meaning of section 812 (c) of the
1939 Code. 1 "What the statute provides is a 'marital deduction'-a de-
duction for gifts to the surviving spouse-not a deduction for gifts to
children or a deduction for gifts to privately selected beneficiaries.""
The taxpayer's contention would be well taken if, for example,
there had been an outright bequest to the wife with a precatory
request that she add to the trust for the children. If the wife
subsequently complied with the request, the marital deduction cer-
tainly would not be defeated. Mr. Stapf, however, made his wife's
acceptance of the benefits of the will conditional upon her transfer
of property. In other words, he did not pass property to the widow
but rather through her. This conditional nature of the transfer to
the wife shades into the second and decisive basis of the Court's
decision.
48 See note 17 supra.
49 See note 20 supra.
" Discussed in text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
"Mr. Stapf died in 1953; this fact brought the construction of his will under the
provisions of the 1939 Code. The relevant section corresponds exactly to S 2056(a) of
the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, and reference will hereinafter be made to the 1954 Code except
when speaking of the principal case directly.
52 375 U.S. at 125. Judge Wisdom, dissenting in the court of appeals, graphically illus-
trates this argument.
After the dust settled, the economic result of this transaction was a gift by
the testator of $106,268.18 to the trust, and a gift by the wife of $5,174.50
[the net loss to her in taking under the will] to the trust. There was, there-




B. The Property Was Encumbered
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court agreed that the
marital deduction issue actually turned on a construction of section
812 (e) (1) (E) (ii) of the 1939 Code," which provides for the
valuation of the interest passing to the surviving spouse as follows:
[W]here such interest or property is encumbered in any manner, or
where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the de-
cedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance
or obligation shall be taken into account as if the value of a gift to
such spouse of such interest were being determined.
The difficulties in applying this section to the case at bar are two-
fold. First, there is the question whether an election by the surviving
spouse is encompassed within the statutory meaning of "obligation"
or "encumbrance." The taxpayer contended that this section was
limited to a charge on the property itself, i.e., a lien or mortgage. Liens
and mortgages certainly do reduce the value of the property passing
to the surviving spouse,' but the intent of Congress, as shown from
the committee reports and the Treasury Regulations based thereon,
was to include an election within the term "obligation."' " Second,
and a bit more troublesome, is the proper construction of the phrase
"such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account as if
the value of a gift . . . were being determined." The court of appeals
in Stapf held that the value of a gift by the husband to the wife
would not be reduced for gift tax purposes even though the wife was
required to give up property to a third person as a condition pre-
cedent to the receipt of the gift. In Commissioner v. Wemyss " it was
held, in effect, that in order to reduce the value of a gift for purposes
of the gift tax, there must be a benefit to the original donor. From
this the taxpayer argued that if there is no benefit to the donor, the
value of the gift to the surviving spouse need not be reduced." In
the Stapf case it is clear that there is no benefit to the donor (Mr.
Stapf) or to his estate. The difficulty with the taxpayer's gift tax
analogy is that under the gift tax law there was no gift to the
surviving spouse (Mrs. Stapf) but rather an indirect gift in trust
"aThis section corresponds exactly to Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (4) (B).
54S. Rep. No. 1013 (pt. 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); Treas. Reg. 118, 5 81.47c(b)(1939).
55S. Rep., supra note 54, at 6; Treas. Reg. 118, § 81.47c(b)(2) examples (i), (ii)
(1939).
5" The majority of the court of appeals agreed that the election constituted an obligation
within the meaning of the statute. 309 F.2d at s98.
57324 U.S. 303 (1945).
" Brief for Respondent, p. 22; Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T.C. 1073 (1948).
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for the children."' Since a gift to the surviving spouse is the primary
requisite for the marital deduction, the gift tax analogy breaks down
when carried to its logical conclusion. Moreover, an example given in
the Senate reports on the Revenue Act of 1948 impugns such a
contention:
If the decedent bequeaths certain property to his surviving spouse
subject, however, to her agreement or a charge on the property for
the payment of $1000 to X, the value of the bequest (and accordingly
the value of the interest passing to the surviving spouse) is the value,
reduced by $1000, of such property. "
C. Deduction Would Defeat Purpose of the Statute
The Court concludes the marital deduction issue by noting that
this holding is in accordance with the general purpose of Congress in
creating the marital deduction. First, the Court says that the pri-
mary purpose of the marital deduction is to allow married couples
in common-law states to have their property taxed in two stages.
To round out the plan, the marital deduction is allowed to persons
in community property states to the extent of approximately one-
half their separate property.' However, the marital deduction was
not intended to pass property to succeeding generations tax free."
Furthermore, the Court indicates that the taxpayer's construction
of the statute would thwart the equalization purpose of the Revenue
Act of 1948 in that an opportunity for a tax deduction would, as
a practical matter, be available more readily to couples in community
property jurisdictions than in common-law jurisdictions." This is
clearly true since for the election doctrine to apply to any significant
degree in a common-law state, the wife would have to own separate
property. Every couple in a community property jurisdiction could,
however, take advantage of the "windfall " " to the extent of the
survivor's interest in the community.
"Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(a) examples 2, 3 (1939). See also Helvering v. Hutchins, 312
U.S. 393 (1941).
65 S. Rep., supra note 54, at 6.
61 Actually, the deduction is allowed to the extent of one-half of the adjusted gross
estate. The language of the court implies that only separate property qualifies for the
marital deduction. Actually, the community also can qualify as long as it does not exceed
one-half the adjusted gross estate. See note 13 supra.
e' This would have been the effect of allowing the marital deduction here. Mr. Stapf's
estate would have a marital deduction for the amount which went to the wife, but it was
the children, not the wife, who got the economic benefit. Thus, the property would not
have been included in her gross estate. 375 U.S. at 128. The Court cites in support of
this proposition the "terminable interest rule" of S 2056(b) of the 1954 Code.
63 375 U.S. at 129.
4 The majority in the court of appeals allowing the marital deduction characterized the




The Stapf holding on the marital deduction issue is sufficiently
clear in its impact on the estate tax of the first spouse to die-the
surviving spouse must receive a net benefit for the property passing
to the survivor to qualify for the marital deduction. A far more
complex question is how the Stapf case will affect the use of the
widow's election and the marital deduction in estate planning. Even
assuming that the spouses have property which would qualify for
the marital deduction, whether it is wise in a particular case to take
advantage of the deduction is a matter replete with inherent com-
plexities." The basic question, of course, is whether to have the
property in question taxed upon the death of the first spouse or
upon the death of the survivor."6 The answer to this question in-
volves a number of tax factors, 7 as well as a consideration of the
probable economic needs of the survivor. Imprudent use of the
marital deduction can cause a severe tax loss upon the death of the
survivor." The Stapf case does not in any way change the nature of
these basic considerations. In fact, the case brings to the foreground
the basic proposition that the marital deduction is not a device to
allow property to escape estate tax, but rather to allow the estate
planner to choose in which estate the property should be included."9
'With regard to a reduction of the estate taxes on the marital unit,"
the planner should note particularly one possibility of using a "typi-
65 ,Intelligent use of the marital deduction requires a combination of skills involving
knowledge of mathematics, psychiatry, soothsaying, and the law." Tannenwald, How to
Provide for the Marital Deduction Other than Trusts and Powers of Appointment, found in
I Lasser, Estate Tax Techniques 101 (1963).
66 "Thus the marital deduction is generally restricted to transfers of property interests
that will be includable in the surviving spouse's gross estate." 375 U.S. at 128.
67 Some of the more important tax considerations are:
(1) The relative size of the estate of the husband and wife;
(2) The extent to which the survivor may be expected to consume or make
gifts;
(3) Life expectancies of the parties;
(4) Whether the estate of the decedent is likely to grow with income or
decline by consumption.
See Powers, How to Solve Mathematical Problems of Husband-Wife Estate Planning, found
in I Lasser, Estate Tax Techniques 3, 42 (1963).
68 For a monetary example, see Bowe, Estate Planning & Taxation § 4.19 (1961).
09 See note 62 supra.
7There is a wealth of commentary and a scarcity of case law on this subject. See,
e.g., Bowe, Estate Planning and Taxation (1961); Lasser, Estate Tax Techniques (1963);
Webster, Avoidance of Marital Deduction Traps in Estate Planning, 8 Tul. Tax Inst. 259
(1959); Weingarten, Gift and Estate Tax Consequences of Widow's Election in Community
Property States, 42 A.B.A.J. 1163 (1956); Westfall, Estate Planning and the Widow's
Election, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1269 (1958); Wren, Estate Planning and the Widow's Election,
34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 281 (1962); Wren, Drafting and Tax Considerations in Community
and Common Law States, 100 Trusts & Estates 13 (1961).
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cal"' widow's election will combined with a marital deduction.
Assume the widow elects to take under a will which disposes of the
entire community and gives her a life estate therein with a remainder
to the children. By her election, the wife gives up the remainder
interest in her one-half of the community (retaining a life estate in
her one-half) in exchange for a life estate in the husband's one-half
of the community. The estate tax consequences of this type of elec-
tion upon the death of the widow were demonstrated in a recent
case with similar facts."2 In Vardell v. Commissioner7' the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the widow's election constituted a transfer with a life
estate retained, and thus the widow's one-half of the community was
includable in her gross estate." However, the court also found that
the life estate she received in her husband's one-half of the com-
munity constituted consideration for the transfer, and, hence, only
the excess of the value of her one-half of the community over the
value of the life estate in the husband's one-half was included in her
gross estate." If the consideration received was a simple life estate,
the court said that it should be valued by use of the mortality tables
at the date of the election,'76 and this value should be credited against
the value of the widow's share of the community at the time of her
death.7 ' Thus, by such a plan it is possible for the husband to give
the wife the use of the entire community for her life, dispose of
the remainder, and at the same time reduce the amount of the wife's
gross estate upon her death by the value of the consideration she "re-
ceives""s for making the election.
If the husband has separate property and also gives the wife
property absolutely, an additional question is raised: to what ex-
tent can the husband's estate receive a marital deduction? Stapf
dictates that for the husband's estate to be allowed the marital
deduction, the widow must receive a net benefit by making the
election. The life estate which passes to the wife is a terminable
interest and thus will not qualify for the marital deduction." Logi-
71 See Comment, Widow's Election Study, 15 Sw. L.J. 8 5 (1961).
7 The actual case was made much more complex by alternative provisions in case of
remarriage and the full power in the wife to sell the property. See text accompanying note
82 infra.
72307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962).
,4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2036. Alternatively, the court suggested that the property
would be included in her gross estate by 5 2038 of the 1954 Code. Either section produces
the same results.
72 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2043 (a) ; Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1 (a) (1954).
'a Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Treas. Reg. S 25.2512-5 (c)
(1954).
" 307 F.2d 688, 693 (5th Cir. 1962).
7' See note 83 infra.
79 See note 17 sufra.
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cally, however, it will be used in determining whether the wife
receives a net benefit."0 Thus, if the value of the property passing
to the widow plus the life estate given to her is greater than the
remainder interest passing from her, the widow will receive a net
benefit and the property passing to the wife can qualify for the
marital deduction to the extent of the net benefit. This also will elimi-
nate any gift tax resulting from the election." Moreover, under
the holding in the Vardell case the benefits passing to the widow are
consideration for the transfer by her and thus will reduce her gross
estate at her death. A word of caution should be added; the valuation
of the consideration received by the widow is currently a matter of
confusion. The estate tax regulations require that property must be
reducible to money value to serve as consideration."2 The court in
Vardell gave several valuation possibilities," but it is uncertain which
of them will be used in any particular case. For this type of plan to
work advantageously, it is essential that the planner have some idea
of the value of the various interests involved. The Vardell case is
unclear, but perhaps if a simple life estate is used, the planner can
estimate correctly its value as consideration by means of the mortality
tables."'
In summary, the Stapf decision does not eliminate the usefulness
of the marital deduction in planning community estates. It does,
however, require the planner to make difficult valuation prognostica-
tions to determine whether any deduction will be allowed and whether
it would be beneficial. Moreover, the valuations of property interests,
such as life estates and remainders, are changing constantly with
the age of the parties, and an estate plan such as outlined above should
be re-examined periodically.
Robert C. Gist
80 It may seem unusual that property which does not qualify for the marital deduction
may be used to calculate the net benefit to the wife, but this does not violate the Stapf
rule, because to the extent that the husband gets a marital deduction, the property will be
included in the wife's gross estate. Indeed in the Stapf case itself, one-third of the combined
community was included in calculating the benefit to the wife.
85 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512(b); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259
F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); Commissioner v. Seigle, 250
F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).
82Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1 (1954).
sa The court seems to suggest that if the consideration received by the wife is a simple
life estate, it should be valued at the time of the transfer by using the mortality tables.
However, the court also says that the market value or the "hindsight" method may be
used, and that in no event is the credit to exceed the lesser of the amount of the life
estate valued as of the date of election and the sums actually received. The particular valua-
tion used can make a great deal of difference in result. In Vardell, for example, the actuarial
value of the life estate in the husband's part of the community was $454,014.38, but
during her life, Mrs. Vardell actually consumed over a million dollars from this interest.
84 See note 83 supra.
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